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ABSTRACT: In this brief note I continue the discussion that I had with John Searle on the 
topic of the self and the possibility of continuity of consciousness after death of the body. The 
gist of Searle's reply to my original paper (Hongladarom 2008) is that it is logical possible, 
though extremely unlikely, that consciousness survives destruction of the body. This is a 
rather startling claim given that Searle famously holds that consciousness is the work of the 
body. Nonetheless, he claims that such issue is an empirical matter which could perhaps be 
discovered by future science. Another point concerns identity of the self or the person. Searle 
claims that the self functions as a unified point of view from which episodes of mental events 
are presented as a coherent picture. Here the Two Truths position in Buddhism differs from 
Searle's here. The "point of view" that Searle mentions exists only at the conventional level, 
but not the ultimate one. 
 
Keywords: self, consciousness, person, identity, Buddhism           
  
In my paper published in the volume Searle’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy 
(Hongladarom 2008), I presented a view of consciousness and self in Buddhism and 
compared that to Searle’s view. In the paper I contended that Searle’s view that 
consciousness is a biological phenomenon does not necessarily conflict with that of 
Buddhism. The points where Searle diverges from Buddhism concerns what happens 
to consciousness after death. Since consciousness is a biological and physical 
activity--Searle’s favorite analogy is digestion, it is extremely unlikely that 
consciousness can survive death of the body. Searle’s view, however, does not 
logically preclude the possibility of survival of consciousness after death, though he 
claims in the response that this is as unlikely as digestion functioning after the death 
of the body. In the reply to my paper he asks a question how one is to know that the 
consciousness that survives the death of the body is mine. This is a very important 
problem, and I intend to take up most of the space in this paper to account for it.  
Furthermore, he also claims that there is no substantial, Cartesian self. This much 
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agrees with the basic tenet of Buddhist philosophy. Searle’s view is that even though 
we cannot find the substantial self, some kind of formal self has to exist in order to 
function as a “point of view” from which things appear in such a way that they make 
sense to the perceiver. This much is akin to what Kant takes to be the Transcendental 
Unity of Apperception, i.e., the formal unity of the self that works as a condition of 
possibility of there being a coherent picture of knowledge of the external world.  
   In this reply I shall take up two points which were discussed in Searle’s reply to 
my original paper, namely the question of survival of consciousness and more 
importantly that of how to account for identity of streams of consciousness that 
putatively survive destruction of the body. Secondly, I will discuss the issue of 
Searle’s idea that the formal self functions as a point of view or an anchor point, or in 
Searle’s words “an essential postulate to make sense of perception.” My view is based 
on insights obtained from Buddhist philosophy, but I don’t claim that it represents the 
standard view of Buddhism on these issues. I doubt that anybody could lay claim to a 
view that purports to be the view that represents all of Buddhist philosophy. On the 
contrary, the views being presented here are actually mine, which naturally result 
from my engagement with Buddhism.  
 
1. SURVIVAL OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS IDENTITY THROUGH TIME 
 
Much of the space in my original paper was spent on detailing the views of the main 
schools of Buddhism on the issue of consciousness and its survival after death of the 
body. This is naturally a point of departure between the Buddhist and Searle. As a 
committed materialist, Searle does not accept that consciousness survives the death of 
the body, though he leaves open a small possibility where somehow consciousness 
can be revived in a dead body in the same as digestion is revived in a dead body. This 
very improbable scenario is not a logical impossibility, and Searle accepts that in the 
future consciousness might continue to exist after death. For him this is an empirical 
matter. However, all schools of Buddhism concur that survival of some form of 
consciousness is entirely possible, and this is a basis for the doctrine of reincarnation, 
which is a lynchpin of Buddhist teaching. Some philosophers such as Owen Flanagan 
claims that this doctrine in Buddhism is outdated and does not have to be accepted by 
contemporary practitioners (Flanagan 2013), who can focus instead of the message of 
Buddhism about getting rid of suffering without having to believe in topics that run 
counter to the scientific mindset.  
  I agree that survival of consciousness after the death of the body is an empirical 
matter. However, Searle seems to commit himself to two apparently contradictory 
views. On the one hand his biological materialism seems to commit him to the view 
that there is nothing to consciousness of an individual after she is dead. There will be 
consciousness for sure, but it is not the consciousness of that particular individual 
who is now dead. On the other hand, Searle appears to accept the possibility, however 
remote, that the consciousness of an individual might continue to exist after her death. 
Perhaps in the future, he says, people then might discuss the issue and find it “how 
hilarious it was that we all thought our consciousnesses would end with the death of 
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our bodies” (Searle 2008, 190). But if it is possible that consciousness could survive 
the body, then it won’t be a working of the brain. If consciousness is a result of a 
work of some material system, then that system does not equate with the biological 
brain, which is contrary to Searle’s own view. Or perhaps the brain is only a 
manifestation of some more refined material system which scientists cannot discover 
at the moment. This subtler manifestation works through the physical brain; if this is 
the case, then Searle might be vindicated after all. But in that case it is not the brain 
itself that is the source of consciousness, but something of which the brain is only a 
manifestation. 
  Another problem concerns identity of consciousnesses. In fact to talk about 
consciousnesses in the plural presupposes that ‘consciousness’ is, grammatically 
speaking, a countable noun meaning that it refers to discrete objects such as rocks and 
chairs. However, consciousness appears to be more a process which is much harder to 
separate out into chunks. If that is the case, then to talk about consciousnesses in the 
plural would presuppose that there are something inside of each consciousness itself 
that unifies it and gives it a structure in a such a way that it is one consciousness and 
not two or three. But if consciousness is a continuous process, much like flowing 
water in a stream rather than a rock or a chair, then there is nothing inside it to unify it 
in that way. In fact in our talk we usually talk about flow or stream of consciousness 
as if it were liquid, and if it is liquid then it cannot be separated out into chunks and is 
not countable. A philosophical import of this is that if consciousness is comparable to 
flowing liquid, then it does not make much sense to find something internal to it that 
unifies it in the sense that the shape and boundary of a rock identifies it as a rock 
instead of two or three. But then if consciousness does survive the body, then we 
cannot find anything that identifies its flow with that of the body except that a 
particular stream of consciousness flows out of the stream that used to reside in a 
particular body of a person. Even then, as Heraclitus famously said, there is nothing 
inside the stream that identifies it as one stream or one consciousness (implying 
consciousness of one particular person). A consequence is then that when the body 
dies, the consciousness then continues to flow on, or at least according to the 
Buddhist belief anyway, which we seem to take for granted at the moment. And as for 
whether this stream of flowing consciousness does belong to the person who is now 
dead or not depends on various factors such as whether the content of the flowing 
consciousness continue the same story, so to speak, with that of the deceased person 
or not, and as stories can branch out and diverge a lot, then there is a sense in which 
the flowing consciousness both belongs to the original person and to another person 
who has just been born. In fact his is the heart of the matter regarding the belief in 
reincarnation. 
  The purpose of this talk about survival and identity of consciousness here is to 
reply to Searle’s passage in his reply where he says: “If I am to be reincarnated by 
another conscious existence, then one wants to know: what fact about the second 
conscious existence makes it identical with me? What fact makes it a reincarnation of 
me? And I cannot see that he has given any satisfactory answer to that question” 
(Searle 2008, 189). I did not say anything about this point because I thought it was 
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obvious; but thinking about it right now I might have been assuming too much, for all 
Buddhists would not doubt how a stream of consciousness arising from a dead person 
could fail to be identified with that person. If a stream of consciousness contains 
episodes which are causally related to those within the stream of a dead person, then 
it is obvious that the stream somehow continues the existence of the stream that used 
to belong to the dead person. This goes toward answering Searle’s question about 
how one is to tell how a stream of consciousness that exists after my death is my 
stream too.  
  To cut a long story short, however, there is no way to answer Searle’s question 
satisfactorily because the question presupposes the existence of a self who claims that 
the stream of consciousness belongs to her, even after she is dead. But that is patently 
impossible. How can a dead person claim something as her own? A dead person 
cannot claim anything. She does not have any rights any longer. Searle asks: “What 
fact makes it a reincarnation of me?” But there is no way to answer this because the 
question presupposes that there is a self that is aware of the stream, which is 
impossible given the fact that the person in question is already dead. The question can 
only be asked in the third person, viz. “What fact makes a stream of consciousness a 
reincarnation of a particular dead person?” This is because the consciousness of there 
being a ‘me’ in this sense does not logically guarantee that the ‘me’ in one conscious 
episode is identical to the ‘me’ in another episode (Hongladarom 2016). In any case 
an answer to Searle’s question is that if the stream contains elements which are 
causally related to the elements within the stream of the dead person, then the stream 
could be regarded as a continuation of the stream that constitutes the life history of 
the dead person. Being a continuation in this sense does not imply that the continued 
stream represents the self of the dead person, but it means that the continued stream, 
which could belong to another person, contains elements of the old, already dead 
person. Containing elements from a previous person, however, is not sufficient to 
guarantee that the new, continued stream represents the very self of the deceased 
person. The thread of memory is not sufficient to guarantee personal identity, pace 
Locke, because of the ever present possibility that the memory might be wrong. In 
this case, then, there being one individual person is accounted in much the same way 
as when we account for a river being one and the same. In case of the river we rely 
primarily on its location as well as its relations toward its environment. In the same 
way, a person is regarded as being identical to herself across time primarily on her 
‘location’ which actually is a complex of the body and mind that, though always 
changing, remains constant enough for others to interact with her fruitfully. There is 
nothing inside the individual that accounts for her own identity. For the river we 
cannot go inside, such as diving into its water, in order to find out an element that is 
responsible for its being one and the same. What we find is only water, or perhaps 
some occasional fish. We instead account for the identity of the river through 
referring to its location, which means how the river interacts with its environment--
how it divides up a city into two halves, how it merges at a particular location with 
another river, and so on. In the same vein, we account for the fact that an individual 
person is identical with herself through her interaction with others and with her 
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surroundings, such as how others perceive her, how she is called, what role she plays 
in her community, and so on. This is important because when it comes to putatively 
surviving consciousness, what accounts for it coming from a particular person (we 
cannot account for it being identical to the person before she is dead because 
consciousness, like a river, is always flowing) is ultimately its relation to others in the 
way described earlier. Memory cannot fully help here because memory is found 
inside consciousness and cannot be relied on to account for the identity of itself. 
Thus, a way to recognize that a particular stream of consciousness comes from a 
particular person and not others is to see how it retains some features that are 
characteristic of the deceased person. (Remember that we are now talking in a very 
speculative manner here.) Suppose it were possible to observe a stream of 
consciousness coming from someone after she is dead (through some very 
sophisticated scientific device, for example). The only way to recognize that this 
stream comes from this person is to see how similar it is to the stream that used to 
exist before the person is dead. The similarity can be greater or lesser, but it can never 
be identical to any episode of the living consciousness. This means that there can be 
no absolute guarantee that a stream of consciousness is exactly identical to that of a 
living person. In other words, identity of consciousness is always constructed. 
 
2. IDENTITY OF THE SELF AT A TIME 
 
What I have just discussed above concerns identity through time, what is commonly 
known as the problem of personal identity, though here there is the added twist of 
personal identity, or identity of consciousness after death. However, in his reply 
Searle mentions another, related kind of identity, that is identity of the formal self. 
The idea comes from Kant’s view on the Transcendental Unity of Apperception 
(B131-132). The ‘I think” must be able to accompany all of my representations; 
otherwise I cannot have any coherent understanding of the world around me at all 
because everything would be mumbo jumbo where nothing can be constructed 
together to create a single point of view or picture. Searle fully endorses the Kantian 
position here. As mentioned earlier, the idea is that in order to maintain a coherent 
picture of the world where understanding and knowledge of the external world is 
possible, there has to be an ‘I think’ or self-consciousness that ties up all the different 
episodes coming to the mind. Searle is careful in pointing out that though he believes 
in the formal self in this sense, he does not believe in any substantial self. The 
different between the two is that the former is purely formal; that is, it does not exist 
as an entity in the world, but is only posited as a necessary ingredient in 
understanding. A way to understand this might be to compare it with the latitudes and 
longitudes on the surface of the world. They do not exist, but they are regarded as 
existing in order to aid in navigation. In the same vein, the formal self does not 
actually exist but is only regarded as existing in order to aid in navigation too, in this 
sense navigation of the mental space.  
  Buddhism does not explicitly recognize the formal self in this sense. On the 
contrary Buddhism recognizes two senses in which the self might be understood. This 
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is the famous two Truths doctrine: Conventional Truth and Ultimate Truth. Basically 
speaking Conventional Truth is the ordinary kind of truth that we are all familiar 
with, such as “The sun rises in the east,” and so on. Ultimate Truth, on the other hand, 
is unique to Buddhism and it points to the view that in the ultimate sense things are 
“empty of their nature;” that is, things have the properties they have (such as an apple 
is red) solely because of extra factors not available within the apple itself. In other 
words, the redness of the apple is a function of other factors such as our eyes and the 
light condition, and is not the responsibility of the apple alone. In fact Buddhism goes 
much deeper than this, for it contends that in this sense even the apple itself does not 
exist (hence it is empty). This is because the existence of the apple depends on 
various causes and conditions and without them we cannot justifiedly say that it 
exists. The Ultimate Truth does not say that an apple, or anything else for that matter, 
does not exist, or that it is an illusion. The apple is still there and (in normal case) is 
not an illusion, but since its existence depends on various causes and conditions it 
cannot exist alone by itself, hence it is ‘empty’ in Buddhist parlance.  
  As for the self, though in the ultimate sense it does not exist, it makes much 
practical sense to regard, as an instance of Conventional Truth, that it exists because it 
would be much easier to refer to others as if they have their own selves instead of 
looking at them in the ultimate sense, which means that everything is dissolved into 
everything else. In the ultimate sense the self does not exist because it depends on 
various factors, much like rainbow is dependent on light and water droplets and does 
not exist on its own. (In fact Buddhism regards everything to act like rainbows in this 
way.) But the difficult this raises in ordinary living makes it necessary that we have 
also Conventional Truth, which is about ordinary perception and language use. In the 
conventional sense, the self can be far more than the merely formal one mentioned by 
Searle. It can have its own substance, if talking about substance is necessary for 
achieving some purposes in communicating. In such a communication, the self would 
be treated as actually substantial, but when it comes to ultimate analysis, the very 
same self here would be analyzed away and its existence found to be as insubstantial 
as a rainbow. Furthermore, latitudes and longitudes can be as substantial and 
objective as possible; they are very useful in navigation and in finding things on the 
map. But they are not there, essentially speaking. And so with the self. 
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